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Item type:Item, Enhancing QKD via Multi-Photon-Lane Systems With a Card-Shuffling-Based Approach(2025-01-01) ;Chaiyasoonthorn, Sawatsakorn ;Youplao, Pirada ;Youplao, Phichai ;Sarapat, NapatsakonMitatha, SomsakThis paper introduces a modified quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on card-shuffling, designed to enhance security against eavesdropper photon number splitting (PNS) strategies. The proposed technique accommodates light pulses with few photons, substantially augmenting the effectiveness and reliability of QKD. It can be implemented as multi-photon-lane systems, enabling concurrent key distribution to multiple users or amalgamation of key data to amplify individual use r key rates. The study assesses the proposed technique utilizing three well-established polarization-encrypted QKD protocols, BB84, B92, and SSP99, and simulations utilizing 4-photon lane systems with wavelengths of 800 nm, 1300 nm, and 1550 nm. The findings, encompassing correlations such as useful key rate, maximum key distribution distance, quantum bit error rate, and photon number probability, are analyzed and compared under different conditions. The outcomes reveal that combining the technique with BB84-based systems employing 1300 nm light pulses and a photon number probability of 1.0 attains a maximum QKD effectiveness of 12.34 Gbit-km/s. Moreover, the effectiveness can be increased to 49.36 Gbit-km/s by implementing the proposed 4-photon-lane system as the serial key-combining scheme. The potential of using multi-photon-lane implementations alongside the proposed technique to enhance the effectiveness and reliability of QKD is theoretically investigated and discussed. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Item, Scenario Analysis of Key Entropy Loss from Improper Quantization Decision in Wireless Physical-Layer Security(2022-01-01)Limmanee, ApirathIn wireless physical-layer security, it is usually suggested in literature that eavesdroppers need to locate themselves near legitimate transmitters or receivers if they want to steal some secret key information. By means of scenario analysis, this paper shows that if the eavesdropper knows the channel statistics better than the legitimate stations, e.g., know the K-factor estimates of Rician fading channel, they can exploit these knowledges to derive some secret key information. We define a concept called 'improper quantization decision loss (IIDL)' as the entropy loss in the generated key that can be obtained by the eavesdropper. We show step-by-step how the eavesdropper can obtain such information. We also propose a mathematical expression and numerical value of IIDL based on empirical values of channel parameters available in literature. If the legitimate parties are aware of this approximated IIDL, they will be able to design suitable privacy amplification scheme for preventing key information loss. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Item, Improper Quantization Decision and Key Entropy Loss in Wireless Physical-Layer Security with False Channel Statistics Knowledge(2022-01-01)Limmanee, ApirathWireless physical-layer security is recently proposed for several types of cutting-edge networks, such as 5G and 6G. In wireless physical-layer security, it is usually suggested in literature that eavesdroppers need to locate themselves near legitimate transmitters or receivers if they want to steal some secret key information. By means of scenario analysis, this paper shows that if the eavesdropper knows the channel statistics better than the legitimate stations, e.g., know the K-factor estimates of Rician fading channel, they can exploit these knowledges to derive some secret key information. We define a concept called 'improper quantization decision loss k' as the entropy loss in the generated key that can be obtained by the eavesdropper. We show step-by-step how the eavesdropper can obtain such information. We also propose mathematical expressions of n and derive some results based on empirical values of channel parameters available in literature. From our analytical result for an urban area case, the loss is as large as almost 4/5 of key information, thus requiring a privacy amplification process that yields about 1/5 of the original key length. With our new concept, the new upper and lower bounds of vulnerable key bits are derived.
