The theory of maximal social welfare feasible coalition

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dc.contributor.authorBoongasame, Laor
dc.contributor.authorBoonjing, Veera
dc.contributor.authorLeung, Ho Fung
dc.date.accessioned2026-08-06T09:55:05Z
dc.date.available2026-08-06T09:55:05Z
dc.date.issued2007-01-01
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a new theory for forming a maximumvalue-cooperation coalition known as the Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition. This theory can give such solution because it does not assume that each player requesting to join a coalition knows information of other players. However, all players' private information requesting to join the coalition is known by an honest coordinator. This allows the coordinator to select a coalition structure with maximal value of cooperation among successful players so as they get at least at their required minimum values. Not only this maximal value is shown to be equal to or larger than the value of a core coalition but also the value allocation is shown to be Pareto optimal. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
dc.identifier.citationLecture Notes in Computer Science Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics, 4570 LNAI, 935-942, 2007
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_93
dc.identifier.issn03029743
dc.identifier.other2-s2.0-37249065232
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.kmitl.ac.th/handle/123456789/1573
dc.sourceLecture Notes in Computer Science Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics
dc.subjectCoalition formation
dc.subjectCooperative game theory
dc.subjectGroup buying
dc.subjectPareto optimally
dc.subjectThe core
dc.titleThe theory of maximal social welfare feasible coalition
dc.typeConference Paper

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