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Subject: search.filters.subject.Coalition formation

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    A new coalition formation based on reservation prices and locations of buyers
    (2013-01-01)
    Narabin, Santit
    ;
    Boonjing, Veera
    ;
    Boongasame, Laor
    This paper defines a coalition as a cluster of buyers in dimensional space of reservation price and location. It defines a new buyer utility accounting for discount and traveling costs. A new coalition with nonnegative utility is proposed to maximize a number of successful buyers. This nonnegative utility coalition also assures that a winner does not have to pay more to subsidize others. Simulation results confirm that performance of the new scheme is significantly better than of a random one and is as good as a reservation price based coalition. © 2013 S. Narabin et al.
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    Forming buyer coalitions with bundles of items
    (2009-09-10)
    Boongasame, Laor
    ;
    Leung, Ho Fung
    ;
    Boonjing, Veera
    ;
    Chiu, Dickson K.W.
    There are several existing buyer coalition schemes, but they do not consider bundles of items. This research presents an algorithm for forming a buyer coalition with bundles of items, called the GroupBuyPackage scheme, in order to maximize the total discount. Our simulation results show that the total discount of the coalitions in this scheme are close to that in the optimal scheme. © 2009 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
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    The theory of maximal social welfare feasible coalition
    (2007-01-01)
    Boongasame, Laor
    ;
    Boonjing, Veera
    ;
    Leung, Ho Fung
    This paper proposes a new theory for forming a maximumvalue-cooperation coalition known as the Maximal Social Welfare Feasible Coalition. This theory can give such solution because it does not assume that each player requesting to join a coalition knows information of other players. However, all players' private information requesting to join the coalition is known by an honest coordinator. This allows the coordinator to select a coalition structure with maximal value of cooperation among successful players so as they get at least at their required minimum values. Not only this maximal value is shown to be equal to or larger than the value of a core coalition but also the value allocation is shown to be Pareto optimal. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.